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We develop an equilibrium model of ticket resale in which buyers' decisions in the primary market,
including costly efforts to "arrive early" to buy underpriced tickets, are based on rational expectations
of resale market outcomes.  We estimate the parameters of the model using a novel dataset that combines
transaction data from both the primary and secondary markets for a sample of major rock concerts.
Our estimates indicate that while resale improves allocative efficiency, half of the welfare gain from
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Ticket reselling is a controversial activity. In many jurisdictions (indeed in many countries) it
is regulated or banned, and even where it is legal it is often stigmatized. Whether labelled
as brokers, scalpers, or touts, ticket resellers are commonly loathed by concert artists, sports
teams, and consumers. Roth (2007) even includes ticket scalping as an example of a \repugnant
transaction." This widespread hostility toward ticket resale seems at odds with the conven-
tional view of economists, which is that voluntary trades made in resale markets result in more
ecient allocations and increased social welfare.1 Resale does not just aect nal allocations,
however. It also aects demand in the primary market, giving rise to initial allocations in the
resale market that are endogenous to anticipated resale activity|resale causes prot-seeking
individuals to purchase tickets who otherwise would not have, and causes some consumers to
bypass the primary market and buy in the resale market. Moreover, by providing a prot-motive
for ticket buyers, resale may stimulate individuals to engage in costly rent-seeking behavior as
they compete to obtain the most valuable tickets in the primary market. For these reasons, not
only does ticket resale give rise to redistributions of surplus in which some individuals are made
worse o, but it may also reduce overall social welfare.
In this paper we present a new model of ticket resale, and we estimate its structural param-
eters using a unique dataset that merges transaction-level information from both the primary
and secondary ticket markets for a sample of rock concerts. The model is designed to provide
a comprehensive analysis of the welfare eects of reselling, including the eciency gains from
ticket reallocation, as well as changes in transactions costs incurred in the primary and sec-
ondary markets. There are three sequential stages of decision-making that we explicitly model.
First, consumers make strategic choices of how much costly eort to exert in an arrival game
that determines the sequence of buyers in the primary market. Second, individuals make choices
about whether to buy in the primary market or to wait for the resale market. Third, purchased
tickets are oered in the resale market to the endogenous pool of potential buyers that did not
purchase in the primary market.
Importantly, buyers' decisions in the primary market reect rational expectations of resale
outcomes. That is, buyers possess expectations of what will happen in the resale market, and
their decisions in the arrival game and in the primary market lead to secondary market outcomes
that are consistent (on average) with these expectations. Hence, for example, some types of
buyers may choose to exert high eort in the arrival game driven by the expectation of reselling
1See, Happel and Jennings (1995), Hassett (2008), McCloskey (1985), Mankiw (2007), and Williams (1994).
In a 1999 Forbes magazine column, Dan Seligman asserted that anti-scalping laws are one of the ten dumbest
ideas of the century (as referenced in Atkinson, 2004).
1good tickets at high prot, and some types of buyers may choose to exert low eort in the
arrival game because they expect to bypass the primary market and buy tickets from resellers.
Incorporating forward-looking behavior is essential for analyzing the welfare consequences of
resale because it explicitly allows the magnitude of transaction costs|and the allocation of
tickets going into the resale market|to be endogenous to the degree of resale activity.
The amount of welfare gain that can result from reallocation depends largely on the degree
of heterogeneity in consumers' valuations. In the model we allow consumers to vary in their
willingness to pay for seat quality, as well as in their costs of exerting eort in the arrival
game. We also allow these two dimensions of heterogeneity to be correlated (either positively
or negatively), giving rise to the possibility that consumers who value good seats the most may
tend to be either early or late in the arrival sequence. Even though consumers obtain utility
from attending the event, the model includes the option for consumers to resell their tickets if
they receive an oer exceeding their own reservation utility from using the ticket themselves.2
The model also includes brokers, whose sole purpose is buying and reselling tickets to make a
prot (they obtain zero utility from attending the event). Brokers have a potentially important
impact on welfare since they provide additional liquidity to resale markets, helping to achieve an
ecient nal allocation, but they also capture some of the surplus for themselves. Brokers may
also drive consumers to incur higher costs in the arrival game, as they stimulate competition for
good tickets.
The key driver of resale activity in our model is underpricing in the primary market.3 Un-
derpricing leads tickets to be ineciently allocated in the primary market, leading to gains from
trade that can be realized in the secondary market. In the data, underpricing is reected mainly
in the coarse price levels chosen by sellers. The rock concerts we analyze typically sell around
15,000 to 30,000 tickets, but these tickets are typically sold at only two dierent price levels.
Hence, thousands of seats with signicant variation in seat quality are all sold at the same price
in the primary market, while in the resale market those seats are naturally resold at greatly
diering prices. The conventional practice of coarse pricing in the primary market is puzzling,
and we do not attempt to oer an explanation in this paper. We simply take primary market
pricing as given, and focus our examination on the resale activity that arises as a result of it.
Our model has at least two novel implications. The rst is that resale markets may reduce
total welfare. When tickets are underpriced in the primary market, there is a strong prot
incentive for individuals to buy tickets with the intent of reselling. This stimulates costly eorts
2In fact the oer must exceed the ticket holder's reservation utility plus the transaction cost in the resale
market.
3Season ticket holders for sports such as baseball may also engage in resale as a form of unbundling. We study
rock concerts where we are able to ignore this particular motivation for resale because rock concerts are rarely
bundled.
2to \arrive early" in the primary market and secure the best (most underpriced) seats. One might
expect the incurred costs to be bounded above by the gains from reselling, but eort choices
are strategic. The set of tickets available to an individual in the primary market depends on
where the individual comes in the arrival sequence, which in turn depends on the eort choices
of other individuals, and the resulting game is a prisoner's dilemma. Consequently, while the
presence of a resale market allows tickets to be reallocated in a way that increases total surplus,
those eciency gains may be more than oset by additional costs incurred in the arrival game.
A second implication of our model is that resale may reduce demand in the primary market.
This result is surprising, because resale provides a valuable option to buyers in the primary
market, and hence ought to increase primary market demand. However, a prohibition of resale
leads to an inecient allocation of tickets, and this ineciency may actually cause more tickets
to be sold. In the absence of resale, high-value consumers may end up with low-quality seats|
and if high-value consumers value all seats more highly than low-value consumers, they may
be the only consumers who would be willing to buy the low-quality seats. If, on the contrary,
tickets could be costlessly resold, then all buyers would rationally anticipate that high-value
consumers will end up with the high-quality seats, leaving no one who is willing to purchase the
low-quality seats. Essentially, resale makes willingness-to-pay a steeper function of seat quality
than it would be in the absence of resale, and the eect on primary market sales can more than
oset the general increase in willingness-to-pay that comes from the option value of resale.
In order to assess the empirical relevance of these eects, we estimate the structural param-
eters of our model using very detailed data on a sample of 56 concerts. To our knowledge, this
is the rst study of ticket resale to utilize transaction data from both the primary market and
the resale market. The primary market data come from Ticketmaster, the dominant ticketing
agency in the industry, and the secondary market data come from eBay and StubHub, the two
leading online outlets for ticket resale. The data contain information on individual ticket sales
in the primary market, the speed of sales in the primary market (which is informative about the
arrival game we analyze), which tickets are resold and at what prices, and whether the tickets
were resold by brokers or non-brokers. Even from a purely descriptive standpoint, our analysis
of these data constitutes a signicant contribution to the understanding of ticket resale markets.
The data reveal several interesting facts about resale markets for rock concert tickets. While
brokers account for the majority of resale activity, 46% of the resale transactions in our data
are sold by non-brokers (i.e. consumers). On average, ticket prices in the resale market are
41% above face value. However, it is relatively common to see prices below face value: brokers
(non-brokers) appear to lose money on 21% (31%) of the tickets they sell. The overall rate of
resale is relatively low during our sample period, with only 5% of purchased tickets being resold
on eBay or StubHub. Of course, for certain events this number is much higher. The event in our
3dataset with the most active resale market had 17% of its tickets resold on eBay or StubHub,
and resale market revenue was equal to 37% of the primary market revenue. The likelihood of
resale is strongly associated with seat quality, as we nd the best tickets are roughly four times
more likely to be resold than low- to mid-quality tickets.
We nd that observed levels of resale activity generate small improvements in allocative
eciency relative to a world without resale. However, these improvements come at a cost. Over
half of the increase in gross surplus is oset by the combination of higher transaction costs in
the resale market and higher costs of eort in the arrival game. Our estimates also imply that
strategic behavior in the arrival game leads to primary market allocations that are signicantly
more ecient than a random allocation, as consumers with high willingness to pay try hardest to
obtain tickets in the primary market. This highlights the importance of allowing for endogenous
arrival|a model with random arrival would dramatically overstate the potential eciency gains
from resale.
We estimate that consumers have large transaction costs, preventing many exchanges that
would otherwise be welfare-improving. Brokers' transaction costs are estimated to be much
lower, and the results of our counterfactual analyses indicate that their participation in the
market leads to a net welfare gain. In general, large reductions in transaction costs (for brokers
and consumers) would lead to potentially signicant increases in social eciency. For example,
we estimate that net social surplus (sellers' revenues plus buyers' net surplus) would increase by
nearly 11% if resale markets were frictionless. We nd that on average frictionless resale leads to
higher demand in the primary market. However, for some events resale has the opposite eect,
with primary market revenues falling by as much as 5% relative to a world without resale.
Finally, even though we estimate that resale increases aggregate surplus, our estimates show
that not everyone is made better o. Under frictionless resale, for example, there is a large
increase in surplus captured by ticket resellers, but a large decrease in the surplus earned by
concertgoers. In other words, while resale reallocates tickets in a way that increases aggregate
surplus, ticket resellers capture more surplus than they create. The biggest losers from resale
are the consumers who actually attend the event.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we briey outline the relevant institutional
details about the market for concert tickets. In Section 3 we discuss the expected welfare eects
of ticket resale, and review the prior literature. In Section 4 we describe how we compiled
the data, and provide summary statistics and descriptive analyses. The model is outlined in
Section 5, and the details of the estimation, including identication, are described in Section 6.
Section 7 discusses the results of various counterfactual simulations designed to assess the welfare
consequences of resale, and Section 8 concludes.
42 Market overview
Live music and sporting events generates $20 billion in primary market ticket sales in the U.S.
each year. Reselling generates roughly $3 billion in revenue each year, and this number is
expected to grow over the next several years (Mulpuru and Hult, 2008). An important distinction
from other ticketed products, such as airline travel, is that event tickets are usually transferable,
which is necessary for legitimate resale activity. In this study we focus on music concerts, which
allows us to avoid the complexity that season tickets, a major component of ticket sales for sports,
would introduce to the analysis.4 Concerts are organized and nanced by promoters, but the
artists themselves are principally responsible for setting prices.5 Typically the artist and/or
artist's manager consults with the promoter and venue owner to determine the partitioning of
the venue and the prices for each partition. Promoters employ ticketing agencies to handle the
logistics of ticket selling. The dominant rm in this industry is Ticketmaster, which serves as
the primary market vendor for over half of the major concerts in North America. Ticketmaster
sells tickets primarily online or by phone. Tickets usually go on sale three months before the
event, and sometimes sell out on the rst day.
Choosing primary market ticket prices is a complex problem for producers. Venues often have
over 20,000 seats, with signicant quality variation, implying many potential price-quality menus
based on dierent partitions of the venue. Rosen and Roseneld (1997) provide a theoretical
analysis of how to divide a venue and what prices to set. TicketMaster has experimented with
auctioning tickets in the primary market, but this is not yet common. The pricing problem
may also be complicated by the possibility that artists have a preference for selling out the
event, perhaps because artists obtain utility from playing to a full house, or because doing so
enhances the experience for consumers.6 These considerations may explain why artists seem to
routinely underprice their concerts. It is also conceivable that concert tickets are complementary
to recorded music sales and other merchandise, in which case the objective is not to simply
maximize ticket revenues. Artists sometimes also cite a desire to be fair or assure access for all
fans.7 All of these are interesting issues, but in this study we do not seek to model or explain
primary market pricing.8 In our empirical model we treat primary market prices as exogenous.
There is no federal regulation of ticket resale, but some states in the U.S. have laws forbidding
or restricting ticket resale. For example, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Michigan prohibit reselling
4There may be instances of event bundling in rock concerts, but they are rare and do not apply to any of the
events in our dataset. See Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (2009) for an analysis of ticket bundling.
5See Connolly and Krueger (2005) for a detailed review of the music industry.
6See Becker (1991), Busch and Curry (2005), and DeSerpa and Faith (1996).
7See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986).
8See Courty and Pagliero (2009) for an empirical study of the determinants of when concerts utilize uniform
pricing versus second degree price discrimination.
5above face value. According to Fried (2004), as of 2004 there were 12 states with restrictions on
resale, and 38 states without any restrictions (aside from limits on selling outside the venue).
However, as best we can tell, these anti-scalping laws are rarely enforced by government au-
thorities, perhaps because they are regarded as victimless crimes.9 Ironically, while eBay makes
ticket reselling easier in many ways, eBay also enforces anti-scalping laws, so that these laws
are perhaps more pertinent today than in the past. Elfenbein (2005) nds that there are fewer
(but not zero) eBay transactions for NFL tickets in states with stricter regulations. There are
various ways to get around the laws, even on eBay, such as charging exorbitant shipping fees. In
any case, in the U.S. there is a clear trend of deregulation: in 2007, for example, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Missouri and New York all repealed anti-scalping laws. Outside of
the U.S., regulatory attitudes are also mixed. In the U.K., the Oce of Fair Trading studied
ticket reselling in 2004 and recommended against regulation.10 Scalping is illegal in some states
in Australia, and was illegal for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.11
The internet has transformed the ticket resale industry. It is widely acknowledged by industry
insiders and in the trade press that eBay is the dominant marketplace for ticket resale, followed
by StubHub.12 Two pieces of evidence support this belief. First, in a survey of concertgoers
at a major rock concert in 2005, Alan Krueger found that eBay and StubHub accounted for
between a third and a half of all resold tickets (see Connolly and Krueger, 2005). Second, based
on survey evidence from 2007, Mulpuru and Hult (2008) report that eBay and StubHub account
for 55% of online ticket resales. Tickets are also resold on numerous other web sites (Razorgator,
TicketsNow, TicketLiquidator, etc), as well as oine.
Note that eBay and StubHub are marketplaces|unlike brokers, they do not own the tickets
that are for sale. These web sites create value by lowering transaction costs. Features at some
sites include interactive seating charts, personalizations, and parking and weather information.
StubHub especially has a reputation for providing a well-designed and user-friendly interface.
The web sites also extract value by charging fees on each transaction: eBay charges a transaction
fee of about $7 for a ticket that is resold for $100, and StubHub charges $25 for a ticket that is
resold for $100. To address fraud, eBay emphasizes their reputation mechanism, and StubHub
provides a guarantee.
9In a study of resale laws, Elfenbein (2005) also notes that he is yet to nd an instance of online ticket resale
being prosecuted by an authority.
10Oce of Fair Trading (2005).
11The International Olympic Committee requires host countries to ban reselling.
12In January 2007, StubHub was acquired by eBay. We study data from before the acquisition.
63 Prior research into the welfare eects of ticket resale
We are certainly not the rst to point out that primary market outcomes depend on buyers'
expectations about the resale market. Several papers address the question: does resale increase
or decrease producers' prots? Williams (1994) nds that NFL primary market prices in 1992
were lower in states with anti-scalping laws, suggesting that resale is good for producer prots.
Depken (2007) studies more recent evidence and nds the reverse. Swoord (1999) provides the
rst theoretical analysis of this question, proposing that brokers have dierent risk attitudes, cost
functions, or revenue functions than producers, which allows them to capture some consumer
surplus without aecting producers' prots.13 Producers may nonetheless lobby for anti-scalping
laws, since reselling causes consumers to pay higher prices without creating higher prots for
producers.
Subsequent theory by Courty (2003) suggests producer prot may be invariant to resale
activity. Courty's model incorporates demand uncertainty at the individual consumer level
(i.e. consumers don't know their own value for the event until just before attending). The
producer has the option of selling tickets at dierent prices on dierent dates, and has the
ability to commit in advance. Courty shows that the producer's prot from selling all tickets
at the last minute to informed consumers (with no resale possibility) is equal to the prot from
selling all tickets early and allowing brokers to buy and resell tickets. Karp and Perlo (2005)
present a model with asymmetric information in which broker activity conveys information to
consumers about the value of tickets, allowing producers to charge higher prices. Geng, Wu and
Whinston (2004) also argue that resale may be benecial to producer prots.
A few papers address the question: does resale benet or harm consumers? Thiel (1993)
argues that the presence of brokers may be good for some consumers and bad for others. Thiel
assumes excess demand in the primary market (with exogenously low prices). The presence of
brokers reduces the probability of a given consumer obtaining a ticket in the primary market,
but provides a second chance for consumers to obtain a ticket in the secondary market. Hence,
brokers may benet consumers that would otherwise miss out on a ticket in the primary market,
but harm consumers that otherwise would have purchased a ticket at a lower price in the primary
market. The net eect on consumer surplus is unclear. Busch and Curry (2005) argue that resale
is harmful to consumers, based on a model with social externalities among consumers. On the
empirical side, Elfenbein (2005) estimates the eect of anti-scalping laws on resale prices for
NFL tickets.14 He nds that stricter regulations result in fewer tickets being resold, higher
13Based on a similar characterization of brokers, Spindler (2003) argues that brokers may enhance producers'
prots: if brokers are better at extracting consumer surplus than producers, this may allow the producer to charge
higher prices than without brokers.
14See also Hassett (2008).
7resale prices and markups. This suggests an increase in resale activity results in lower resale
prices, which may be attributable to competition among resellers. The implications for consumer
surplus are unclear.15
Our approach diers from the prior research in four fundamental ways. First, unlike several
of the prior studies mentioned above, we do not allow the producer to sell tickets in multiple
periods. In the model we present below, the producer sells tickets in the primary market in
period one, and resale activity takes place in period two. This is a simplifying assumption,
motivated by the fact that there is minimal overlap in the timing of primary market activity
and resale activity (as we show in the next section), and also by the fact that no producer in our
dataset implements any form of dynamic pricing|primary market prices are equal over time for
every event.16 But our approach does preclude us from evaluating any counterfactual pricing
scheme in which producers vary primary market prices over time.
Second, we allow consumers (in addition to brokers) to resell tickets. This is important
because it fundamentally aects how consumers value tickets in the primary market, and also
because it allows consumers to capture some of the rents from reselling that only accrue to
brokers in the prior research. Brokers may still be at an advantage over consumers in their
role as resellers, because we allow for the possibility that brokers have lower transaction costs.
Another benet of our approach is that we can implement counterfactuals that preclude brokers
from participating in the market while still allowing consumers to resell, or we can prohibit all
resale activity. Perhaps even more importantly, our approach reects reality|46% of the resold
tickets in our dataset appear to have been sold by non-brokers (as reported in the data summary,
below).
A third distinguishing feature of our approach is that we assess the welfare of consumers who
attend the events separately from the welfare of consumers and brokers who engage in reselling.
This is important because, as we show in our counterfactuals, resale activity can be harmful to
the welfare of consumers who attend events, and benecial to consumers who engage in resale.
Moreover, the latter eect can outweigh the former|resale is good for consumer surplus, even
though those who attend the events are made worse o. To the best of our knowledge, no prior
paper has explicitly considered this distinction.
Fourth, we incorporate a strategic game of costly eort to determine the arrival sequence
of buyers in the primary market. None of the prior papers incorporate into the analysis the
impact of resale on costly eorts in the primary market. This is an important extension for a
15Some of these issues are also addressed in a recent study of resale price dynamics by Sweeting (2008).
16Note, however, that our model includes uncertainty of the same kind emphasized in Courty (2003). Namely,
consumers do not know whether they will be able to attend the event in period one (due to the possibility of a
schedule conict).
8couple of reasons. It allows us to take into account the eect of resale on primary market costs.
It allows us to incorporate non-random arrival in the primary market|i.e. correlation between
consumers' valuations and their arrival order|which itself is based on a formal model of decision
making. As we explain below, this feature also provides us with an estimation strategy that
relies on less restrictive assumptions.
4 Data
Our data combine detailed information about primary and secondary market sales for a sample
of rock concerts performed during the summer of 2004. Our sample is not intended to be
representative of the thousands of concerts performed that summer. Rather, it focuses on large
concerts by major artists, for which resale markets tended to be most active. For each concert,
we observe details about tickets sold through the primary market vendor (Ticketmaster), as well
as information about all tickets that were resold on eBay and StubHub.
Two unique features of the dataset are especially valuable for this research. First, by merging
data from Ticketmaster, eBay, and StubHub, we observe primary and resale activity in parallel.
We suspect that data from either market in isolation would still be interesting and informative.
But by combining data on primary market sales and resales, we are able to study the interaction
between the two markets, which we believe is crucial to understanding how these markets work.
Second, as we explain below, we distinguish resale activity by brokers from resale activity by
consumers. For the reasons explained in Section 3, this is important to evaluating the welfare
eects of resale.
Figure 1 illustrates the data for two example concerts: one by Kenny Chesney and another
by the Dave Matthews Band. In each graph, the vertical axis represents price, and the horizontal
axis represents seat quality, ordered from worst to best (we explain the measure of seat quality
in more detail below). Consider the rst panel, which shows the data for a Kenny Chesney
concert performed in Tacoma, Washington. The dots along the horizontal lines represent tickets
that were sold in the primary market, at three dierent price points. The other dots and squares
represent resales by non-brokers (i.e. consumers) and brokers, respectively. Resale activity was
concentrated among the highest-quality tickets, and the average premium paid for these tickets
was substantial. The gure also illustrates that resale prices were highly variable, with some
relatively high-quality seats even being sold below face value.
In the following subsections we explain how the data shown in Figure 1 were assembled. We
describe the primary market and secondary market data sources in turn, and then explain how
9they were merged. We also report basic summary statistics, and describe some patterns in the
data that motivate various aspects of our empirical model.
4.1 Primary market data
The primary market data were provided by Ticketmaster. The sample includes 56 concerts
performed by 12 dierent artists: Dave Matthews Band, Eric Clapton, Jimmy Buett, Josh
Groban, Kenny Chesney, Madonna, Phish, Prince, Rush, Sarah McLachlan, Shania Twain, and
Sting. In total there were 1,034,353 tickets sold or comped in the dataset. For each concert,
we obtain information from two sources: a \seat map" and a daily sales audit. The seat maps
essentially list the available seats at a given event, indicating the order in which the seats were
to be oered for sale, and the outcome (i.e., sold, comped, or open).17 The daily audits contain
ticket prices (including the various Ticketmaster fees), as well as how many tickets were sold in
each price level on each day. Essentially, the daily audits allow us to assign prices and dates of
sale to the seats listed in the seat maps. The information on the timing of sales in the primary
market is crucial for our analysis of the arrival game, detailed below.
We use the ordering of seats in the seat map data as our measure of relative seat quality.
The main virtue of this approach is that it reects the primary market vendor's assessment of
quality: Ticketmaster uses this ordering to determine the current \best available" seat when a
buyer makes an inquiry online or by phone. Also, it allows us to measure quality separately
for each seat, as opposed to using a coarser measure (e.g., assigning qualities by section). The
seat orderings are also fairly sophisticated. For example, seats in the middle of a row might
be ranked above seats toward the outsides of rows further forward, and seats at the front of
upper-level sections are sometimes ranked above seats at the back of lower-level sections.
Nevertheless, using this measure of seat quality has its drawbacks. Although the orderings
appear to be carefully determined, we suspect they are not always perfect. More importantly,
Ticketmaster's ordinal ranking of tickets does not tell us anything about absolute dierences in
quality between seats. We know that a given ticket is supposed to be better than all subsequent
tickets in the ordering, but we do not know how much better. Because we think any information
we could bring to bear on absolute quality dierences would inevitably be arbitrary, in the
analyses below we simply assume that quality dierences are uniform|i.e., the dierence in
quality between seats j and j + s is the same regardless of j. Specically, we use 1   (j=J) as
our measure of quality, where j is the seat's position in the \best available" order, and J is the
17A \comped" or complementary seat is one that was given away. Comps are typically around 1% of ticket
sales (and are always less than 3%) for the events in our sample. An open seat is an available seat that went
unsold.
10total number of tickets available. The best seat (j = 0) therefore has quality 1, and the worst
seat has quality 1=J.
4.2 Secondary market data
To obtain information about resales, we captured and parsed eBay auction pages for all tickets
to major concerts in the summer of 2004. From these pages we determined how many tickets
were sold, on what date, at what price (including shipping), and the location of the seats. We
only use auctions that ended with a sale (either via a bid that exceeded the seller's reserve, or
via \Buy-it-now"). The auction pages also list information about the seller, including the seller's
eBay username. We use this to distinguish between brokers and non-brokers: we categorize an
eBay seller as a broker if we observe her selling 10 or more tickets in the data.
We also obtained data from StubHub, a leading online marketplace designed specically for
ticket resale. For every concert in our sample, we observe all tickets sold through StubHub, and
for each transaction we observe the number of tickets sold, the seat location, the price (including
shipping and fees), the date, and the seller identity and classication (broker vs. non-broker).
This information was provided directly by StubHub, and includes some details that are not
available at their web site.
Matching eBay auctions to specic concert events was straightforward, albeit tedious, be-
cause the auction pages contain standardized elds for the venue and event date. The process
of assigning resales to specic seats was more complicated, because exact seat numbers were
rarely reported in the eBay or StubHub auctions. We were able to determine the section and
row for 75% of the resale transactions. For another 23% we could only determine the section.
For the remaining 2%, our parser did not even detect the section, and we simply dropped these
transactions from the analysis.18 We are left with 68,828 resold tickets (the vast majority of
them on eBay).
Beginning with transactions for which we observed both the section and row, we assigned
resales to specic seats by spreading them evenly throughout the relevant section and row. So,
for example, if in the Ticketmaster data we see that there were 20 seats in section 101, row 3,
and we observe 3 tickets resold on eBay or StubHub in section 101, row 3, we assign them to
seats 5, 10, and 15 within that row. Once the section-and-row transactions were assigned, we
then assigned section-only transactions using the same principle. Suppose that after assigning
all the section-and-row transactions, 200 seats in section 101 remain unassigned. Then if we
18Dropping these sales means that our data will slightly understate the total amount of resale on eBay and
StubHub for these events.
11observe 4 tickets resold in section 101, unknown row, we assign those 5 tickets to seats 40, 80,
120, and 160 (of the 200).19
For the empirical model we estimate below, it would be ideal to observe all resale activity
for the sample concerts. We do not know exactly how much of total resale activity is accounted
for by eBay and StubHub. As explained in Section 2, eBay is almost certainly the largest single
outlet for ticket resales, with StubHub likely the second largest. Where necessary in our analysis
below, we simply assume that the combined market share of eBay and StubHub is 50%, and
later test the sensitivity of our ndings to this assumption. Note that even if we knew eBay's and
StubHub's exact market shares for rock concerts in the summer of 2004, we would have no way
to verify if resales on these two sites are representative of resale activity more broadly. However,
the fact that both brokers and non-brokers have a signicant presence on eBay suggests that
our data might be roughly representative of resale activity more broadly.
4.3 Summary statistics
As mentioned above, the dataset covers 1.03 million tickets sold in the primary market for 56
concerts by 12 dierent artists. Table 1 provides more detailed summary statistics. The capacity
of each concert varies from 3,171 to 35,062 (the median is 17,483). The events were mostly sold
out: over 75% of the concerts in our sample sold 100% of their capacity.
The average ticket price in the primary market was $90.54 (including shipping and fees).20
However, there is a good deal of price variation across events: the inter-quartile range of the
distribution of average prices across events is from $54.48 to $144.15. There is also some within-
event price variation, but not much. Most events tend to oer tickets at only two dierent price
levels. The maximum number of price levels for a single event in our data is 4, and 6 concerts
sold all tickets at a single price. The bottom panel of Figure 1 depicts one of these events with a
single price in the primary market (in this case, for all 24,873 seats). As we show in our analysis,
the low number of price levels in the primary market, relative to capacity, is a key driver of resale
activity.
We observe over 51,000 of the tickets purchased in the primary market being resold at eBay
or StubHub (i.e. 4.96% of the number of tickets). As shown in Table 1, the maximum number
19We also tried putting resales at the middle of their respective sections and rows, instead of spreading them
evenly. That is, if there were 20 seats in the row, and three tickets resold, we assign the resales to seats 9,10,
and 11 instead of 5, 10, and 15. We will check to make sure our empirical results are robust to this alternative
approach.
20To be clear, $90.54 is the average across events of the average ticket price at each event. If all tickets are
weighted equally, the average ticket price in the primary market is $81.04.
12of tickets resold for a given event is 3,130, or 17% of the tickets sold in the primary market. For
most events the fraction of tickets resold is between 3% and 6%. On average, total revenue to
resellers is equivalent to 8% of the primary market revenue, and the maximum for any single
event is a striking 37%. It is important to remember that these numbers are based on reselling
at eBay and StubHub alone, so they represent a lower bound for the total amount of resale
activity.
Table 2 provides additional summary statistics of resale activity.21 The average resale price
is $113.23. Resellers make signicant prots: the average markup is 41% over the face value,
and 25% of resold tickets obtain markups above 67%. On the downside for resellers, 26% of
tickets are sold below face value. Resold tickets are not a random sample of those purchased in
the primary market, and in particular the resold tickets tend to have signicantly higher face
values than non-resold tickets: the average price in the primary market of the resold tickets is
$90.43, while the average price of all purchased tickets in the primary market is $81.04.
One reason why resold tickets tend to have relatively high face values is that resold tickets
tend to be for relatively better seats. The average seat quality of tickets purchased in the
primary market is 0.50, but in Table 2 we report the average seat quality of resold tickets is 0.61
(median is 0.65). Figure 2 provides a more complete picture of the tendency for resold tickets
to be higher quality than resold tickets. The gure shows the predicted probability of resale
as a function of seat quality, obtained either from a parametric regression of a resale indicator
(equal to one if the ticket was resold) on a cubic polynomial in the seat quality variable, or from
a semiparametric regression.22 It is clear that while tickets of all qualities are sometimes resold,
higher-quality tickets are signicantly more likely to be resold.
Of course seat quality is a key determinant of prices in both the primary and secondary
markets. But there are a couple of important dierences between these markets in terms of how
price relates to seat quality. First, in the primary market prices are based on coarse partitions
of each venue. Meanwhile, resale prices reect small dierences in seat quality|every seat may
have a dierent price. Figure 3 depicts the general pattern of resale prices as a function of
seat quality (showing both parametric and non-parametric functions). It is apparent that resale
prices vary signicantly according to seat quality. This is especially true for the highest-quality
seats, where resale prices are a particularly steep function of seat quality. This gure also serves
as a reality check on the data.
Another important dierence in how seat quality is priced in the primary and secondary
21In Table 1 an observation is an event, while in Table 2 an observation is a resold ticket.
22In both cases, event xed eects are included. The semiparametric regression is an adaptation of Yatchew's
(1997) dierence-based estimator for partial linear regression models.
13markets relates to monotonicity. Primary market prices are weakly monotonically increasing in
seat quality for a given event. In contrast, the examples in Figure 1 illustrate that resale prices
are a rather noisy function of seat quality, and there are numerous instances of a low quality
seat resold at a higher price than a higher quality seat (for a given event). This is basic evidence
of ineciency in the resale market. On the one hand, the resale market allows price to be a
more exible function of seat quality. On the other hand, some form of friction in the resale
market causes signicant variance in price conditional on seat quality. As we detail in the next
section, our empirical model explains this fact as being a consequence of limited participation
by potential buyers in resale market auctions.
The analysis in this study emphasizes the consequences of limited price exibility in the
primary market (i.e., utilizing only a few price levels) on resale activity. In Figure 4 we present
basic evidence in support of this view. By denition, all seats in a given price level at a given
event have the same face value. However, there can be thousands of seats in a given price level,
and the dierence in seat quality between the best and worst seats in the price level can be
dramatic. At equal prices there will be higher demand for the good seats in a given price level
than the bad seats. We therefore expect more resale activity for the relatively good seats in any
given price level. Figure 4 shows exactly this pattern.
Figure 4 is evidence that unpriced seat quality is an important driver of resale activity. But
notice also that the lowest quality seats in any given price level are also resold with positive
probability (roughly 2%). This is consistent with other drivers of resale activity, such as general
underpricing or schedule conicts. From the gure it appears that unpriced seat quality may be
the most important driver of resale activity.
In the primary market, tickets typically go on sale 3 months before the event date. In Table 1
we report that (averaged across events) 70% of tickets purchased in the primary market occur in
the rst week. In fact the concentration of sales in the rst week is even more striking than this
number suggests. In the top panel of Figure 5 we depict the complete time-pattern of sales in the
primary market. It is clear that sales in the primary market are highly concentrated at the very
beginning. The time-pattern of sales in the resale market is less concentrated than the primary
market, as shown in the lower panel of the gure. In Table 2 we report that 50% of resale
transactions occur within 26 days of the event, and 25% of resale transactions are within 7 days
of the event. In the model presented in the next section we assume primary market transactions
occur in period 1, and resale transactions occur in period 2. The above facts suggest this is a
reasonable simplication.23
23The dynamics of resale prices are similar to those reported by Sweeting (2009) for Major League Baseball
tickets, with one exception. Prices in the secondary market decline gradually as the event date approaches, but
unlike for baseball tickets, prices for the events in our data tend to increase slightly in the two-week period just
14The empirical model we estimate below allows consumers to invest in early arrival|i.e., to
compete to be rst in line to buy tickets in the primary market. Consumers' incentives to do so
depend on the degree to which the tickets are underpriced. In fact there is substantial variation
across events in how compressed the sales are in time. For about 10% of concerts, more than
75% of the seats are sold in the very rst day. But the median concert sells only 25% of capacity
in the rst day, and less than 75% in the rst week. This suggests that people make costly
eorts to show up early when excess demand is expected to be high: if it were costless to show
up early, we would not expect to see any concerts with sales so spread out over time. Indeed,
the concerts in our sample with the largest resale markups also tend to sell a higher fraction of
tickets in the rst day.
As noted above, brokers are potentially important agents in resale markets. Based on seller
identiers, 11% of the sellers in the resale market are brokers, and they account for 54% of
resold tickets (as reported in Table 2). One of the more important facts in our data is that
46% of resold tickets are sold by non-brokers (i.e. consumers). In the table we also report that
21% of the tickets resold by brokers were at prices below the purchase price in the primary
market. By comparison, 31% of the tickets resold by consumers were sold below face value.
One possible explanation for this dierence is that unlike brokers (who never intend to attend
the event), consumers sometimes resell tickets because of schedule conicts. There are other
possible explanations, but these numbers suggest 10% of the resale activity by non-brokers is
an upper bound for the fraction of resales that are due to schedule conicts.24 In the structural
analysis we obtain a specic estimate of the rate of schedule conicts (taking into account other
potential reasons for resale).
The total prot (i.e. aggregate markup) obtained from ticket resale in our data is slightly over
$1.17 million. This is equivalent to 1.4% of total revenue in the primary market for these events.
As a measure of \money left on the table" this suggests a fairly modest amount of forgone prot
by rms in the primary market. This may be misleading, however, because modied pricing
policies that capture some of this value may also be more ecient at extracting consumer surplus.
We address this issue in the counterfactual analyses in Section 7. And this number could be
considered a lower bound, since we do not observe all resale activity (as mentioned above, we
believe we observe about half of all resale activity).
Lastly, we wondered if resale prices depend on the number of tickets grouped together. In
particular, do pairs of tickets tend to sell for a higher price (per ticket) than single tickets? This
would aect modeling assumptions in the next section. In an unreported regression, we regress
log(ResalePrice) on event dummies interacted with seat-quality deciles (i.e. exible event and
before the event.
24Another possible explanation is that brokers are better at identifying events with signicant excess demand.
15seat quality controls), and dummy variables for each of 1,...,5 tickets resold together. We found
that the number of tickets has no signicant eect on the resale price.
5 Model
An important driver of resale is arbitrage: prot-seeking behavior that takes advantage of
underpricing (of particular seats, at least) in the primary market. Underpricing implies excess
demand, requiring a mechanism for rationing tickets to buyers. We adopt a standard approach,
in which buyers make purchase decisions in a sequence, with choice sets that are updated to
reect purchases made by buyers who came previously in the sequence.25 The ordering of
buyers is far from innocuous in this analysis, however. If we assumed that buyers were ordered
from highest willingness to pay to lowest, this would yield an ecient allocation of tickets in the
primary market, eliminating the principal motive for resale. Assuming that buyers are randomly
ordered is more plausible, but precludes the possibility that high-value consumers may tend to
arrive early in the sequence (because the benets of being early are higher for these buyers than
for low-value buyers), or that high-value consumers may tend to be late in the arrival sequence
(because high-value buyers tend to have a high opportunity cost of time).
For these reasons it is essential to let the data reveal the arrival sequence. However, even
this is not enough. Simply estimating the correlation between willingness to pay and arrival
order in the primary market would not reveal how that correlation would be dierent if resale
were banned or if resale were frictionless. In other words, just as the initial allocation of tickets
in the resale market is endogenous, the arrival order of buyers in the primary market is also
endogenous. How much eort people exert to buy tickets in the primary market depends on the
existence and characteristics of the subsequent resale market.
We therefore propose a model of resale with three sequential stages of decision making. In
the rst stage buyers (consumers and brokers) make strategic eort choices in an arrival game
that determines the ordering of buyers in the primary market. In the second stage buyers make
purchase decisions in the primary market. In the third stage the resale market takes place. The
equilibrium of the model is one in which all buyers behave optimally given their expectations
about payos in subsequent stages, and their expectations are on average correct given that all
agents in the model are behaving optimally.
In the following sections we outline the structure of the model. To keep the exposition
25Leslie (2004) implements a similar approach. See Mortimer and Conlon (2007) for an alternative approach
to demand estimation with stock-outs.
16as simple as possible, we defer some of the details (such as functional form assumptions and
simplications made to reduce computational burden) until Section 6.1.
5.1 Primitives
There are two kinds of agents in our model: brokers and consumers. The principal distinction
between them is that brokers get no utility from consuming a ticket: if they purchase in the
primary market, it is only with the intention of reselling at a prot. We assume there are M
potential buyers in the market, a fraction  of which are brokers.
Consumers are heterogenous in their willingness to pay (!) for seat quality, and in their
cost () of arriving early in the primary market. These two dimensions of heterogeneity are
jointly distributed with marginal density function fc(!;). Brokers' costs of arriving early in
the primary market are distributed with marginal density fb().
If a consumer attends the event, she obtains gross utility U(; !), where  is the seat quality.
Buyers' eorts to arrive early in the primary market (in order to secure higher quality tickets)
are costly: we use C(t; ) to denote the cost of arriving at time t for a buyer of type . Letting p
denote the ticket price in the primary market, a consumer who purchases a ticket in the primary
market and attends the event gets net utility equal to
U(; !)   p   C(t; ) :
For a buyer who purchases in the primary market and then resells at price r in the secondary
market, the net payo is
r   p   C(t; )    ;
where  is the transaction cost of reselling the ticket. The consumer who buys the resold ticket
earns net utility
U(; !)   r   C(t; ) :
In this case C(t;) may be zero, since the consumer may have chosen not to make any eort to
buy a ticket in the primary market.
In essence, the objective of our empirical exercise is to use data on prices (p and r), quantities,
and the timing of primary market sales (t) to estimate the distributions of buyer heterogeneity
(fc and fb) and the parameters of the utility and arrival cost functions (U and C). Having
recovered these primitives, we can then simulate market outcomes under various changes to the
market environment (e.g., reductions in the transaction cost, , or increases in the sophistication
of primary market pricing).
175.2 Arrival game
An agent's type is dened as the triple (b;!;), with b = 1 for brokers. In the arrival game agents
have private information about their own types and have common knowledge of the distributions
of types and the number of players. Strategies are dened as mappings from types to arrival
times: t 2 <+. The higher is t, the later the agent arrives in the primary market. The arrival
cost function, C(t; ), is decreasing in t, and the marginal cost of arriving earlier is increasing
in  (i.e., @2C=@t@ < 0).
The benet of an early arrival time (low t) is that earlier arrivals get to purchase higher
quality tickets. But the ordering of agents in the primary market depends on the arrival times
chosen by all agents: only relative arrival times matter. Since types are private information,
upon choosing t an agent is still uncertain about her place in the eventual sequence. In other
words, letting z denote the relative position in the buyer sequence, from the perspective of an
individual buyer the mapping from t to z is stochastic.26 Moreover, the payo associated with
relative position z is also uncertain, because it depends on choices made by buyers earlier in
the sequence, and it depends on uncertain outcomes in the resale market (which we describe
in more detail below). We denote the expected payo associated with arrival position z as
V0(z; b; !). The dependence on b and ! reects the fact that expected payos dier for brokers
versus consumers, and that (for consumers) payos depend on the marginal value of seat quality.
Naturally, V0 is decreasing in z for all buyers: early positions are the most valuable.





V0(z;b;!)g(zjt)   C(t; );
where







In this notation g(zjt) is the probability of being in relative position z given arrival time t, and the
function H(t) is the equilibrium distribution of chosen arrival times across all agents. Because
the number of buyers in our empirical application is very large, for purposes of estimation we
treat the mapping from t to z as deterministic, with z = H(t).27
The equilibrium distribution of arrival times can be obtained from an iterative procedure.
Given V0 and an initial conjecture H0(t), we calculate optimal arrival times for a large sample of
buyers drawn from the distributions fc and fb. The distribution of these arrival times becomes
26By \relative position" we mean that if a buyer is tenth out of one hundred, then z = 0:1 (for example).
27For large M, g(zjt) converges to a point mass on E(zjt), which is just H(t).
18our new estimate, H1(t), and we then recalculate the arrival times that buyers would have chosen
if they believed other buyers' arrivals were distributed according to H1(t). We iterate in this
way until supt jHs(t)   Hs 1(t)j < 0:01. In practice, this procedure converges very quickly.
Importantly, note that the inclusion of an arrival game makes the welfare impact of resale
ambiguous. Resale increases total surplus by reallocating tickets to consumers with the highest
valuations, but it may also increase buyers' costly eorts in the arrival game|and these costs
may more than oset the gains from reallocation. To understand why, consider a toy example
in which a single ticket is sought by three potential consumers with net valuations of 30, 20,
and 10. By incurring a cost of 6, each buyer can \arrive early." If a buyer is the only one to
arrive early, she gets the ticket with probability one; if two or more buyers arrive early (or if no
one incurs the cost), each has an equal chance of getting the ticket. In the absence of resale,
only the two consumers with the highest valuations will arrive early, and expected surplus is
1
2(30 + 20)   2(6) = 13. If the ticket can be costlessly resold, then its value becomes 30 for
all three consumers, and all three have an incentive to incur the arrival cost. Expected surplus
is 30   3(6) = 12: the additional costs incurred in the arrival game (6) more than oset the
gains from reallocation (5). The key idea is that the possibility of resale increases low-valuation
consumers' (or brokers') incentives to obtain the tickets, increasing costly eort in the arrival
game.
5.3 Primary Market
In the primary market stage, buyers make purchase decisions in the order that was determined
in the arrival game. Buyers are limited to choosing from the set of unsold tickets at their turn
in the sequence, and each buyer is limited to buying one ticket. When making their purchase
decisions, buyers are forward looking. Consumers know that they will either consume the ticket
(i.e., attend the event) or resell the ticket. Brokers who purchase in the primary market will
always try to resell the ticket. We assume that both brokers and consumers incur transaction
costs if they choose to resell, denoted b and c, respectively. The buyers in the secondary
market are the consumers who chose not to purchase (or were rationed) in the primary market.
Buyers' decisions in the primary market are driven by their expectations about the resale
market. Our model incorporates four sources of uncertainty about resale market outcomes. The
rst is randomness in the arrival sequence, as mentioned above. Unless the resale market is
entirely frictionless (b = c = 0), the equilibrium will depend on the allocation of tickets in
the primary market, which in turn depends on the order in which buyers made their purchase
decisions.
19A second source of uncertainty is the possibility of unanticipated schedule conicts.28 We
assume there is a probability   that a given consumer will have zero utility from attending the
event, with the uncertainty being resolved between the primary and secondary market stages.
Notice that if   is large, the ability to resell tickets in a secondary market may signicantly
increase willingness to pay in the primary market.
Randomness in auction participation is the third source of uncertainty. As explained below,
we clear the secondary market using a sequence of auctions, with a random subset of potential
buyers participating in each auction. Obviously, realized outcomes in the resale market will
depend on the particular subsets of buyers who bid for each ticket.
The fourth source of uncertainty is an aggregate (event-specic) shock to demand. We
assume that the distribution of willingness to pay (fc) is subject to shocks that are unobservable
at the primary market stage. Buyers know the distribution of these shocks, but only observe the
realized value of the shock after the primary market stage is complete. Incorporating this fourth
kind of uncertainty is necessary if we want the model to t the data. Specically, for many
events we observe both consumers and brokers reselling tickets below face value. For consumers,
such transactions could be explained by unanticipated schedule conicts. But for brokers, we
would never observe resales below face value unless brokers sometimes overestimate the strength
of demand. Essentially, uncertainty about the strength of demand allows us to explain why
some events sell out in the primary market but then have very thin resale markets with very low
prices, while other events do not sell out in the primary market but then have very high prices
in the resale market.
The price of a ticket in the resale market is principally a function of its quality, but it will
also depend on the realizations of the uncertainties described above. For notational convenience,
let 	 be a random variable representing all four sources of uncertainty, and dene the resale
price function R(j	) to be the resale price for a ticket with quality  given the realization of
	|i.e., the arrival sequence, the schedule conicts, the subsets of bidders participating in each
resale auction, and the demand shock.29
The decision problem for a broker in the primary market is to purchase the ticket j that
maximizes
E(ub
j) = E(R(jj	))   pj   b;
where pj is the primary market price of ticket j, and E(R(jj	)) is the expected price of ticket
j in the resale market, where the expectation is with respect to the four sources of uncertainty
28This source of uncertainty is equivalent to the uncertainty emphasized by Courty (2003) in his model of ticket
resale.
29The details of how we implement these features of the model are explained in Section 6.1 below.
20described above. Of course, if the transaction cost b exceeds the expected resale prots, a
broker also has the option of not purchasing a ticket for a payo of zero.30
A consumer's decision problem is somewhat more complicated, as illustrated in Figure 6. If
a consumer buys ticket j in the primary market, with probability   she will be forced to resell
the ticket, obtaining some price R(jj	). While not illustrated explicitly in the gure, she also
has the option of discarding the ticket if the transaction cost is higher than the resale prot, in
which case her payo is  pj. If she has no schedule conict, she will have the choice of reselling
or using the ticket, with the latter option delivering a net utility of U(; !) pj. The expected
payo from buying ticket j is therefore
E(ucjbuy j) =  pj +  E (maxf0;R(jj	)   cg) +
(1    )E (maxf0; R(jj	)   c;U(; !)g):
Again, the expectations are with respect to 	 (arrival sequences, schedule conicts, bidder
participation, and demand shocks).
If instead the consumer chooses not to buy a ticket in the primary market, but rather wait
until the secondary market, her expected utility is given by
E(ucjwait) = (1    )E (maxf0;U(; !)   R(~ j	)g):
In this case, the consumer is not only uncertain about what the prices will be in the resale
market, she is also uncertain about which ticket (if any) she will be able to buy. We use the
notation ~  to indicate that ticket quality is itself a random variable for a consumer who chooses
to delay her purchase.
5.4 Resale market
The result of the primary market stage is an allocation of tickets to buyers. Some brokers and
consumers hold tickets, and some consumers remain without tickets (either because they elected
to wait for the secondary market, or because the event sold out before their turn in the buyer
sequence). This allocation is not necessarily ecient, since the consumers without tickets may
have higher willingness to pay than some ticketholders. In the resale market stage, ticketholders
have the opportunity to sell their tickets to higher-value consumers. An important feature of
our model is that the pool of potential bidders in the resale market is endogenous, consisting
30We omit costs incurred in the arrival game from the present discussion, because those costs are already sunk
when the primary market decision is made.
21of consumers that either decided to wait and buy a ticket in the resale market, and consumers
that were rationed out of the primary market due to the purchases of others.31
A natural way to clear the resale market would be to calculate every buyer's willingness to
pay for every ticket (with the ticketholder's willingness to pay being equal to her reservation
price), and then nd a vector of prices such that there is no excess demand for any ticket.
Although this approach is feasible in our model, it has one major drawback: it predicts resale
prices that are monotonic in seat quality, which is very far from what we observe in the data.
While resale prices increase on average as a function of seat quality, there is considerable variance
in observed prices conditional on seat quality.
To accommodate this feature of the data, we clear the resale market using a sequence of
private-values, second-price auctions with limited bidder participation.32 We begin with the
highest quality ticket and randomly select L bidders. The owner of the ticket is oered a price
equal to the second-highest willingness to pay among those L bidders. If the oer exceeds the
owner's reservation price, then the ticket is transacted at that price: the bidder with the highest
willingness to pay gets the ticket, and both seller and buyer exit the market.33 If the oer is
below the reservation price, the ticket remains with the seller. In this case, if the seller is a
consumer, she uses the ticket herself and gets the consumption utility dened above; and if the
seller is a broker, she gets utility zero. Losing bidders remain in the pool of potential buyers.
This process is then repeated for all tickets that were purchased in the primary market, in order
of decreasing quality. In this mechanism every ticket purchased in the primary market is for
sale in the resale market, regardless of whether it is owned by a broker or consumer.34
5.5 Equilibrium
Given the structure of payos described above, a rational expectations equilibrium is one in
which: (i) brokers and consumers make decisions optimally in the arrival and primary market
stages given their expectations about payos in the nal stage (the resale market); and (ii) those
31All potential bidders must also have avoided a schedule conict.
32Assuming an auction mechanism in the resale market also corresponds with the actual functioning of this
market.
33We allow only one transaction per period for any individual. So we do not allow consumers to buy in the
primary market, sell in the resale market, and then buy another ticket in the resale market. We also rule out
reselling any ticket twice. See Haile (2001) for an analysis of auctions followed by resale.
34Note that even in the limit as L grows large, our approach diers from the \market-clearing price vector"
approaches proposed for clearing assignment markets (e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Crawford and Knower
(1981)). Instead of assuming that all buyers and all sellers are in the market at the same time and are aware of
all other traders, we assume that buyers arrive randomly and sequentially, and do not anticipate participating
in later auctions if they lose the current auction. Hence, while buyers in our model are forward-looking in the
primary market stage, within the resale stage they behave myopically.
22expectations are on average correct given optimal decision-making in the arrival game and
primary market.35 The challenge is nding expectations that rationalize a set of arrival times
and primary market decisions that in turn lead to resale market outcomes consistent (on average)
with those expectations. In other words, the trick is to nd a xed point in the mapping of
expectations into average resale market outcomes.
The expectations described in the equations above cannot be calculated analytically, even for
particular assumptions about the probability distribution of 	 (or its components). Although
realizations of this random variables lead deterministically to a set of resale market outcomes,
the form of the function R(j	) is not known. Nor is it possible to determine the value of ~  as
a function of 	.
We therefore take a computational approach to solving this problem. We conjecture a
parameterized approximation to the buyers' expected values, and then iterate on the parameters
of that approximation until we converge to a xed point. We do this separately for expectations
at the arrival game stage and the primary market stage, since the information set is slightly
dierent at each of these stages. In particular, buyers in the arrival game are uncertain about
which seats they will be able to buy in the primary market, because they cannot anticipate the
exact purchase decisions of buyers who come ahead of them in the sequence. At the primary
market stage, however, buyers know exactly which seats are available, and the only remaining
uncertainty is about resale market outcomes.
Consider rst the primary market stage. As explained above, a buyer's expected utility,
as a function of the primary market choice, depends on: (i) whether the buyer is a broker or
consumer; (ii) the quality () of the ticket purchased, if any; and (iii) the buyer's ! if the buyer
is a consumer. We therefore choose a parametric function V1(b;;!j1) to represent buyers'
expectations at the primary market stage, where b is an indicator for whether the buyer is a
broker, and 1 are the parameters.
The algorithm for nding a xed point is as follows:
1. Choose an initial set of parameters, 0
1. Simulate primary and secondary market outcomes
for S draws on the model's random variables (arrival sequences, schedule conicts, etc.),
where consumers make primary market choices to maximize V1(b;;!j0
1).
2. Use the realized nal utilities from the simulations in step 1 to re-estimate the function
V1(b;;!j1). Essentially, we regress realized utilities on a function of b, , and ! to obtain
35Forward looking consumer behavior with rational expectations of future market outcomes is also essential in
recent papers by Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007), and Hartmann and Nair (2007). See also Chevalier and
Goolsbee (2009).
23a new set of parameters, 1
1.
3. Use the new set of parameters from step 2 to simulate primary and secondary market
outcomes as in step 1. Iterate on steps 1 and 2 until V1 converges|i.e., until V1(b;;!jn
1)
is suciently close to V1(b;;!jn 1
1 ).
In the actual estimation, we use a very simple parameterization of V1. Letting h be an
indicator for whether the buyer holds a ticket going into the second period, we let
V1(b;;!j1) = b  h  (10 + 11) + (1   b)  h  (12 + 13 + 14! + 15!)
+(1   b)  (1   h)  (16 + 17!): (1)
This parameterization captures the essential elements of the expectations described above. For
a broker, expected utility depends only on the quality of the ticket owned, . For a consumer
without a ticket, expected utility depends only on the consumer's willingness to pay for quality,
!. For a consumer holding a ticket, expected utility depends on both  and !, since ultimately
the ticket will either be consumed (yielding a payo that depends on  and !) or resold (yielding
a payo that depends on ).
Convergence of this algorithm means we have found a set of expectations V1 such that the
primary market choices that follow from V1 lead to secondary market outcomes consistent with
V1. The convergence criterion we use is based on average dierences in V1. At each iteration
of the algorithm, we essentially estimate the regression described in equation (1) using M  S



















In other words, we stop when the tted values of V1 dier from those of the previous iteration
by less than half of one percent on average.
At the arrival game stage, buyers' expectations about nal payos are not a function of
, because there is uncertainty about the seat qualities that will remain at the buyer's turn
in the sequence. We therefore approximate expectations as V0(z;b;!j0), and use an iterative
procedure analogous to the one described above to nd a xed point for V0. Namely, we begin
with a conjectured set of parameters 0, solve the arrival game given the implied V0, determine
primary and secondary market outcomes given the resulting arrival sequence (including nding
a xed point for primary market expectations V1), and then regress the nal payos on a simple
function of z (relative arrival position), b (a broker dummy), and ! (the buyer's willingness-to-
pay parameter) to obtain a new estimate of 0. We iterate until the tted values of V0 dier
from those of the previous iteration by less than half of one percent on average.
24The specic parameterization we use for V0 is
V0(z;b;!j0) = b(00 + 01z + 02z2) + (1   b)(03 + 04! + 05z + 06z2 + 05!z) :
6 Estimation and results
Because the equilibrium of the model described above cannot be derived analytically, we estimate
the model by simulated GMM. For a given set of model parameters, we can draw a sample of
consumers and brokers randomly from fc and fb and compute the equilibrium outcomes in each
stage of the model. By averaging over a large number of these simulations, we obtain predictions
about arrival times, primary market sales, and secondary market sales (including resale prices)
as a function of the model's parameters. Heuristically, our estimation approach is simply to nd
a set of parameters that minimizes the dierences between the outcomes we observe in the data
and those predicted by the model.
Not surprisingly, this estimation approach is computationally intensive. The fact that the
iteration on V1 is nested within the iterations on V0 makes the computational burden especially
heavy. To make estimation feasible, we make several simplifying assumptions. These assump-
tions, along with the specic functional forms used for the utility function (U) and the arrival
cost function (C), are described in the next section.
6.1 Details
We assume that the distributions of buyers' types (fc and fb) are lognormal. Specically, we
assume that for consumers













and for brokers ! = 0 with
log   N(b;2
) :
Thus we estimate the means and variances of willingness to pay and arrival cost, and for con-
sumers we estimate the correlation between willingness to pay and arrival cost type. The distri-
bution of arrival cost types for brokers is assumed to have the same variance as for consumers,
but the mean is scaled by b. This allows for the possibility that brokers have better technologies
for coming early in the buyer sequence (as is often alleged in the news media), in which case we
would expect our estimate of b to be less than one.
25Let j 2 (0;1] denote the quality of ticket j, measured as described in Section 4.1.36 We
assume consumer i's gross utility from attending event k in seat j is
Uijk = k(1 + (!i + k)

j ) ; (2)
where !i is consumer i's willingness to pay for seat quality, and k is a mean-zero shock to
the demand for event k. As explained above, event-specic demand shocks allow the model to
explain why some sold-out events have low resale prices, while other events that didn't sell out
can have high resale prices. Since buyers don't know the realization of k when they make
their primary market decisions, there is some risk in purchasing tickets with the sole intention
of reselling them. For purposes of estimation, we assume that k  N(0;2
).
The chosen functional form for utility implies an intuitive interpretation of !: when k = 0,
the ratio of a consumer's willingness to pay for the best seat (j = 1) versus the worst seat
(j = 0) is just 1 + !. The curvature term, , captures the potential nonlinearity of premia
for high quality seats (as evidenced in Figure 3). The idea is that even for a given consumer,
willingness to pay is likely to be a nonlinear function of seat quality. Event-specic variation in
willingness to pay is captured by k.
Since estimating the k's adds 56 parameters to an already dicult nonlinear optimization
problem, we take a simple (but reasonable, we think) shortcut. In a preliminary step, we estimate
event xed eects in a regression of resale prices on seat quality and seat quality squared. We
then assume that in the utility specication above k =    ^ k, where ^ k are the xed eects
estimated from the auxiliary regression. The ^ k's should eectively capture dierences in the
relative strength of demand across events. We then estimate only  , which allows the model to
scale the event xed eects up or down in order to improve the t of the model.
As explained above, we clear the resale market with a sequence of auctions. We assume that
the number of bidders in the auction for seat j is Lj = 1 + ~ Lj, with ~ Lj  Poisson(L). We
explain below how the data identify L.







; fort 2 (0;]:
Thus, if a consumer chooses t = , she incurs no costs in the arrival game. The 's can be
interpreted as the \exogenous" arrival times: the times at which buyers would have arrived in
the primary market in the absence of any strategic eorts to arrive early.
36If j is the ticket's position in the \best available" order, and there are a total of J available, then j  1 (j=J).
26The arrival game is solved many times for every calculation of the GMM objective function,
so it is a signicant contributor to the overall computational burden of the estimation. To speed
the computation, we make two simplications. First, instead of solving for the equilibrium
distribution of arrival times, H(t), nonparametrically (which in principle is possible), we instead
parameterize H(t) as a Weibull distribution, and iterate on its two parameters. We found that
the (converged) Weibull distribution is typically a good approximation to the actual distribution
of arrival times. In other words, even though the actual distribution of arrival times chosen in
equilibrium is not literally a Weibull, the Weibull provides a reasonably good t.37
As a nal step toward making the computational burden more manageable, instead of sim-
ulating outcomes for events with thousands of seats, we simulate events with 200 seats, and
then scale up the predictions to match the size of the event in question. For example, for an
event with 10,000 seats, with 4,000 and 6,000 seats in two respective price levels, we simulate
primary and secondary market outcomes for an event with 200 seats, with 80 and 120 seats in
the two respective price levels. We then \scale up" by applying the predictions for seat 1 in the
simulated event to seats 1-50 in the actual event, the predictions for seat 2 to seats 51-100, and
so on.38
To summarize, there are 15 parameters to be estimated: the parameters of the buyer-type
distributions (!; ; !; ; !; ; b), the nonlinearity parameter in the utility function (),
transaction costs for brokers and non-brokers (b, c), the probability of a schedule conict ( ),
the standard deviation of the event-specic demand shock (), the mean number of bidders in
the resale auctions (L), the scaling parameter in the arrival cost function (c0), and the scaling
parameter for the event xed eects ( ). In the next section we explain which moments we use in
the GMM estimation, and describe the variation in the data that identies these 15 parameters.
6.2 Identication
A wide range of moment conditions could potentially be incorporated in the estimation. For the
results reported below, we used a set of moments chosen to reect the key sources of identifying
variation in the data: the fraction of available tickets sold in the primary market (1 moment),
average fraction of tickets resold by consumers (1 moment), average fraction of tickets resold by
brokers (1 moment), average resale price (1 moment), average quality of resold tickets, separately
37We also tried using Lognormal, Gamma, and Exponential distributions, but found that the Weibull assump-
tion consistently yielded the best t. The second simplication in the solution of the arrival game is that we
discretize the set of possible arrival times. Each buyer i chooses ti from a discrete grid on (0;i]. For the results
reported below, this grid has 60 evenly spaced points.
38This introduces additional noise into our estimator, but in principle we can eliminate as much of this noise
as we want by increasing the size of the simulated event up to the size of the actual event.
27for broker resales and non-broker resales (2 moments), 25th and 75th percentiles of resale price
distribution (2 moments), and 25th and 75th percentiles of resale seat quality distribution (2
moments), the fraction of primary market sales occurring in each of ve time \buckets" (5
moments),39 the fraction of rst-day sales that are in the top price level (1 moment), the fraction
of rst-day sales that are in the second price level (1 moment), the fraction of sales in days 2-7
that are in the top price level (1 moment), the fraction of sales in days 2-7 that are in the second
price level (1 moment), and the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of resale
prices on seat quality and seat quality squared (1 moment). Hence, we use a total of 20 moments
to estimate the 15 parameters.
Formally, letting ~ sl and sl denote the simulated and empirical values for each moment, we
construct moment conditions of the form ml() = ~ sl() sl, and select  to minimize m0Wm,
where  is the set of all parameters, m is the stacked vector of moment conditions, and W
is a weighting matrix. We employ the usual approach by rst obtaining a consistent estimate
of , calculating an estimate of the optimal (variance-minimizing) weighting matrix, and then
re-estimating  by minimizing m0 ^ Wm.
Two important variables in our model are neither known to us as data nor identied by the
data as parameters. The rst is the size of the market, M. In the estimates reported below,
we x M to be 2.5 times the capacity of the event. The second is the fraction of total resales
that our data account for. As explained above, we use the available information and assume
that eBay and StubHub account for 50 percent of total resales. This factors into the estimation
when we match predicted resale probabilities to observed resale outcomes: we simply divide in
half the probabilities predicted by the model (i.e. we match the data to the probability of resale
times the probability of observing that resale).
For the estimated parameters we provide intuition for how basic patterns in the data provide
identication. The \curvature" parameter  is identied by the shape of the relationship between
resale prices and seat quality (e.g., as shown in Figure 3). The shape of the price-quality
relationship also inuences the estimates of ! and !, the mean and standard deviation of the
distribution of log !. However, these parameters are driven primarily by the level of resale prices
for the highest-quality tickets: as explained above, a consumer's ! determines the ratio of her
willingness to pay for the best seat vs. the worst seat. If we observe in the data that resale prices
for the best seats are typically 3 times more than for the worst seats, then the distribution needs
to be such that the highest draws of ! are around 2.
The amount of heterogeneity in willingness to pay (as captured by !) is also related to
the observed variance in resale prices. In combination with L, which determines the average
39The ve buckets are (day 1, days 2-7, days 7-14, days 15-30, days 31+).
28number of bidders who randomly participate in each resale auction, this heterogeneity drives
our model's prediction of how \noisy" the relationship between resale prices and seat quality
will be. If ! is small and L is large, for example, then our model would predict a very tight
relationship. This identication argument is the rationale for including the standard deviation
of the residuals from a regression of resale prices on seat quality as a moment to be matched in
the estimation.
The standard deviation of demand shocks, , is identied by the frequency with which
tickets are resold at a loss. Essentially, the more often we observe instances where buyers
(especially brokers) overestimated demand for an event, the larger will be our estimate of .
The fraction of buyers who are brokers () is mainly driven by the relative frequency of
sales by brokers in the resale market. To be clear, however, the estimate will not simply equal
the relative frequency of broker sales in the data. If consumers have higher transaction costs
than brokers, as we expect, then brokers will be more likely than consumers to speculate in the
primary market|so even a small  could be consistent with a large fraction of resales being
done by brokers.
The probability of schedule conicts,  , is driven by the relative rate at which consumers
versus brokers resell below face value. The model assumes that both types of buyer have the
same information, so they should be equally likely to overestimate demand for an event. To the
extent that consumers are more likely than brokers to sell at a loss, in the model this must be
driven by schedule conicts (which matter for consumers but are irrelevant for brokers).
Identication of the transaction costs is driven by ticketholders' relative propensity to resell
at high versus low expected markups. Loosely speaking, positive transaction costs allow the
model to rationalize low rates of resale in the data even for tickets that would have fetched very
high markups. More specically, the transaction costs estimates should depend on the slope of
the relationship between the probability of resale and the expected markup, and particularly on
where that slope becomes positive. For example, suppose that c is equal to $10. For tickets
that would resell for less than $10 above face value, the model will predict very low probabilities
of resale by consumers. More importantly, the probability of resale will be independent of the
expected markup if that markup is less than $10. Only as the expected markup rises above $10
will the probability of resale increase (i.e., at $10 the slope would become positive).
The arrival cost parameters (, , and c0) are identied by the timing of purchases in the
primary market. Intuitively, the data reveal the marginal benet of accelerating arrival in the
primary market. To the extent that resale prices capture the tickets' market value, they also tell
us how much more valuable it was to be 1st in the buyer sequence as opposed to 101st, say. For
29events that were dramatically underpriced, this dierence tends to be large, so we expect buyers
to hurry and tickets to sell out very quickly. By contrast, for an event that is not underpriced,
the incentives to arrive early are much weaker: only consumers with high willingness to pay for
quality (high !) have much incentive to hurry to the front of the line. Essentially, for any given
event the data tell us (a) how valuable it was to come early and (b) how quickly the tickets sold
(i.e., how hard buyers tried to come early), and observing this relationship across several events
allows us to back out what the costs of early arrival must look like. Naturally, the moments
related to the timing of primary market sales are intended to leverage this source of variation.
The estimate of b, which represents the degree to which brokers' arrival cost distribution
diers from the distribution for consumers, is driven by the dierence in the average quality of
tickets resold by brokers vs. consumers. In the data, brokers resales tend to be for higher-quality
tickets, suggesting that they may be better than the average non-broker at \arriving early" in
the primary market.
Finally, the correlation between arrival cost types () and willingness to pay (!) is identied
by the relative demands for high-quality versus low-quality tickets early in the arrival sequence.
Consumers who arrive early in the primary market can typically choose between high-quality,
high-price seats and lower-quality, lower-price seats. If early arrivers tend to buy lower-quality
seats (e.g., seats in the second price level or lower), this would suggest that  and ! are positively
correlated. This idea motivates the inclusion of moments measuring high- vs. low-quality sales
in the early portion of the on-sale period. In addition to this source of identication, however,
it is worth pointing out that the overall level of resale activity also inuences the estimate of
!. In the model, if ! and  are negatively correlated, then the early arrivers also tend to be
the buyers with the highest willingness to pay. In that case the primary market allocation is
relatively ecient, leading to smaller gains from reallocation and fewer resales. If instead ! and
 are positively correlated, then the primary market allocation is very inecient and (all else
equal) we would expect to see a high volume of resale activity as tickets are traded from low-!
consumers to high-! consumers.
6.3 Estimation Results
The estimates are reported in Table 3. Consumers' transaction costs are estimated to be about
$61, which may seem high. However, many consumers have never used eBay before and perceive
there to be signicant setup costs involved in doing so for the rst time. Another interpretation
is that the transaction cost captures an endowment eect (see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler,
301990)|consumers' valuations of tickets increase after purchasing them.40 Brokers are estimated
to have lower transaction costs than consumers, which is not surprising. Further, the mean of
the arrival cost distribution for brokers is estimated to be 0.17 times the mean for non-brokers,
suggesting that brokers have signicantly better technologies for arriving early in the primary
market. The estimated fraction of brokers () is 0.004, implying that there is one broker for
every 250 consumers.
We estimate that consumers' willingness-to-pay and arrival cost parameters (! and ) are
negatively correlated. Thus, consumers who value the tickets highly will also tend to come earlier
in the primary market buyer sequence. An implication is that the primary market allocation
will be somewhat more ecient than a random allocation. We examine this issue more closely
in the next section. The estimated distribution of ! is such that the average consumer is willing
to pay 2.3 times more for the best seat than she is for the worst seat. A consumer at the 90th
percentile of the distribution would be willing to pay about 3.8 times more.
The parameters of the arrival cost distribution imply that if no eort were exerted in the
arrival game, only about 25% of the buyers would arrive in the rst week of the onsale period.
To arrive on the rst day, a consumer at the 50th percentile of the distribution of  would incur
costs of roughly $24, while a consumer at the 90th percentile would incur the same cost to arrive
on day 7.
The estimate of L implies that resale auctions have on average only 3.4 buyers participating.
This number seems small relative to the number of buyers we observe submitting bids on eBay
auctions, but not all of the bids we observe on eBay should be considered serious bids (many
auctions begin with a number of lowball bids). In any case, this estimate is driven by the
relatively high variance of resale prices (conditional on seat quality) that we observe in the data.
In general, the model ts the resale-related moments fairly well: the predicted rate of resale is
very slightly lower than the rate observed in the data, and the predicted quantiles of resale prices
are slightly higher than those observed in the data. The model underpredicts the average fraction
of tickets sold in the primary market by nearly ten percentage points, and also underpredicts
the fraction of tickets that are sold in the rst day. We suspect the model would achieve a
signicantly better t of the primary market moments if it were computationally tractable to
estimate event xed eects (i.e., the k's) directly.
40Krueger (2001) argues that endowment eects are in fact important in ticket markets.
317 Counterfactual analyses
We now turn to our primary objective of quantifying the resale market's impact on aggre-
gate social welfare and the distribution of surplus among primary market sellers, brokers, and
consumers. We do this by means of counterfactual analyses: i.e., given our estimates of the
structural parameters, as reported in Table 3, we simulate market outcomes under various hy-
pothetical changes to the market environment. It is important to note that we do not re-optimize
primary market prices under the various counterfactuals, although of course we do incorporate
endogenous primary and secondary market decisions of consumers and brokers.41
Table 4 compares outcomes under varying levels of resale frictions. To construct the table, we
calculate averages across 100 simulated outcomes for each event (i.e., outcomes for 100 separate
draws of 	), and then report averages across the 56 events. For the \base case" we simulate
the model at the estimated parameter values. Outcomes in the no-resale case are simulated by
setting the transaction costs (b and c) to arbitrarily high levels. To simulate outcomes with
frictionless resale, we set transaction costs to zero and increase the number of participants in
the resale auctions to essentially include all potential buyers (by increasing L to a very high
number).
Welfare consequences of resale
The rst three columns of Table 4 are based on the estimated model, in which the buyer
sequence is endogenous (with buyers playing a strategic arrival game). In the top row we report
the gross surplus of the consumers who attend the event. The principal consequence of resale
markets is to reallocate products to consumers with higher willingness to pay, and changes in
the gross surplus of attendees capture the eciency gains from this reallocation. To facilitate
comparisons across regimes, we normalize all numbers in the table so that gross surplus equals
100 in the no resale case. There is no ex-ante ambiguity about the eect of resale on gross
surplus of attendees|resale helps tickets end up in the hands of high value consumers. In terms
of magnitude, we nd that the actual level of resale in the data results in 1% higher gross surplus
than if there was no resale. Under frictionless resale, gross surplus is 11.7% higher than the no
resale case. Although not shown in the table, under frictionless resale 46% of tickets sold in the
primary market are resold (on average).
However, there are costs to achieving this improvement in allocative eciency. In the base
case we nd that the combination of transaction costs in the resale market and increased in
41While it is possible that sellers would adjust ticket prices in response to the hypothetical changes we consider,
we do not know how prices would adjust, since it is not even clear that the sellers' objective is to maximize prots.
32costs of eort in the arrival game amounts to 60% of the gross surplus gain. Hence, while gross
surplus increases by 1%, net surplus increases by only 0.5% (under the base case relative to no
resale). Under the base case, arrival costs increase by a only a small amount. By comparison,
in the frictionless resale regime we nd that arrival costs signicantly increase, because the
possibility of costless resale increases buyers' incentives to compete for the best tickets. Under
purely frictionless resale, everyone values the best seat at the willingness-to-pay of the highest-!
consumer.
We noted above that in principle the increased costs associated with resale could more than
oset the improvement in allocative eciency. While this is not the case on average for our
estimated model, our simulations indicate that for some events net surplus would increase if
resale were eliminated. That is, while gross surplus is always higher in the base case versus the
no-resale case, for some events this increase is outweighed by the combination of transaction
costs and increased arrival costs in the base case. At observed levels of resale activity, therefore,
the impact of resale on net social surplus may be positive on average, but it is a close call. By
contrast, we nd no ambiguity in the frictionless resale case: relative to no resale, we estimate
that frictionless resale would increase net surplus for all events in our sample.
The bottom panel of the table shows how the surplus is divided among the various market
participants. Two ndings are especially noteworthy. First, primary market revenues are higher
(on average) in the presence of frictionless resale. As explained above, the eect of resale on
primary market sales is theoretically ambiguous. In fact, the simulations indicate that for 9 of
the 56 events the ineciency of the no-resale allocation actually leads to more primary market
sales, since high-value buyers end up consuming low-quality seats that otherwise wouldn't be
purchased.
A second noteworthy nding is that resale signicantly reduces the net surplus of event
attendees. Under the base case, attendees' net surplus is 1% lower than the no resale case.
Under frictionless resale attendees are 17% worse o. Interestingly, consumers that engage in
reselling (non-broker in the table) are the biggest winners (under frictionless resale). This raises
an interesting distinction: frictionless resale leads to a 15% increase in total consumer surplus,
but a 17% decrease in surplus of consumers that actually attend the event. This is a symptom
of the more general conclusion that reselling results in a transfer of surplus from attendees to
resellers (which in our analysis happens to include consumers). Put simply, in a world with
frictionless resale, consumers get the \right" tickets, but they pay a much higher price for them.
Importance of endogenous arrival
A central point of this study is that it is essential to model the impact of resale on primary
33market behavior, in order to fully assess the consequences of resale activity. In particular, the
eorts of buyers to obtain tickets in the primary market|which determine the allocation of
tickets in the primary market|depend on whether resale is possible. In the last two columns
of Table 4 we show how dierent our conclusions would be if we instead assumed that buyers
arrive in a purely random sequence (regardless of whether resale is possible). That is, instead
of allowing buyers to choose their arrivals strategically, we simply assign the sequence randomly
in a way that is independent of willingness to pay.
Without resale, a purely random buyer sequence leads to an allocation that is 31.5% less
ecient than the allocation that results from endogenous arrival. This is because endogenous
primary market allocations are signicantly more ecient than random allocations: high value
buyers tend to invest in early arrival. Importantly, this also means that if we had estimated the
model without endogenizing the arrival sequence, we would have dramatically overstated the
potential gains from reallocation through resale. Under random arrival, frictionless resale leads
to a massive increase in net surplus from 68.5 to 108.5|an increase of 58% (compared to 11%
under the model with endogenous arrival).42 Attendees also benet from resale under random
arrival, contrary to the endogenous arrival model.
Strategic interaction in arrival game
As noted above, eort choices in the arrival game are strategic decisions because the position
of any individual in the arrival sequence depends on the eort levels of other buyers (in addition
to their own eort). Figure 7 graphically shows the strategic eect that resale has on arrival
costs, based on the estimated model. The gure is based on averages across all events. On the
horizontal axis are the deciles of the marginal (estimated) distribution of consumers' willingness
to pay for seat quality (!). The solid line represents the percent change in average arrival cost
for each decile of consumers, due to a change from no resale to frictionless resale. The dashed
lined indicates the percent change in average position in the arrival sequence, for each decile.
It is evident from Figure 7 that low-! consumers dramatically increase their arrival costs
when resale is allowed, for the reasons explained above. Of greater interest is the fact that
average arrival costs also increase for high-! types. On the one hand, resale may cause some
high-! consumers to reduce their eort in the arrival game, preferring instead to let others incur
those costs, and knowing that they have the option of waiting to buy a ticket in the resale market.
On the other hand, if they do wish to purchase a ticket in the primary market|preferably an
underpriced, high-quality ticket|then the high-! types will need to increase their arrival eorts
42Note that if resale were literally frictionless, then the gross surplus of attendees would be equal in columns 3
and 5 of the table. However, buyers' inability to trade up in the resale market means that the nal allocation still
depends to some extent on the order of arrivals in the primary market.
34as a strategic response to the higher eorts of the low-! types. The gure indicates that the
latter eect tends to outweigh the former.
The dashed line in Figure 7 shows that the (sometimes dramatic) increase in arrival eort
results in barely any change in the arrival sequence. Recall that we estimate a negative correla-
tion between ! and : high value consumers tend to have a low cost of eort. Combined with
high-! types' stronger incentives to obtain the best tickets, this leads to a no-resale equilibrium
in which high-! consumers tend to be early in the arrival sequence. As shown in the gure,
frictionless resale causes these same consumers to increase their eorts in order to preserve their
early position, futher illustrating the importance of strategic interaction in the arrival game.
Role of brokers
Since many legal restrictions on ticket resale seem to be motivated by hostility toward bro-
kers/scalpers/touts, in Table 5 we explore counterfactuals with variation in the presence of
brokers. The rst column reports results from simulating the model with , the share of buyers
who are brokers, set to zero. In the second column  is set to its estimated value of 0.004, and
in the last two columns we experiment with signicant increases in the presence of bokers, by
increasing  to 0.02 and then 0.10. We normalize all values in the table based on the gross
surplus under the base case (set to 100).
The table shows that increasing the presence of brokers leads to higher levels of gross surplus.
This is because brokers provide liquidity to the resale market by virtue of having lower transac-
tion costs than consumers. Increasing broker presence leads to a slight reduction in arrival costs.
This is interesing because the frictionless resale counterfactual (reported in Table 4) revealed an
increase in arrival costs. The reason for the dierence is intuitive|frictionless resale increases
the value of arriving early for low-! consumer types, leading them to exert more eort; but
increasing the presence of brokers has no impact on the value that any consumer places on any
ticket, leading to no direct impact on eort choices. There remains an indirect eect on eort
levels via strategic interaction, but this eect is apparently swamped by the simple fact that
brokers themselves are estimated to have lower costs of arrival. Hence, it is not surprising that
increasing the presence of brokers has a positive eect on net surplus.
As shown in Table 5, we nd the eect of brokers on attendees' net surplus is less clear. A
small increase in the fraction of brokers in the market is good for consumers, because the benets
from reallocation outweigh the higher prices paid to brokers. However, in our counterfactual
with  = 0:10 we nd that attendees are worse o than at any lower level of brokers (including
no brokers at all). Notably, this is not because brokers capture more value than they create|
indeed, comparing the counterfactuals of  = 0 with  = 0:10 we nd that brokers capture 23%
35of the value they create. The big winner from increasing the presence of brokers is the primary
market seller.
Re-pricing best seats
We noted above that much of the observed resale activity in our data appears to be driven
by unpriced seat quality. In particular, consumers evidently are willing to pay signicant price
premiums for the very best seats, but these seats are typically sold together with many inferior
seats at the same coarsely-dened price level. To understand what would happen to resale
activity if the best seats were re-priced, we simulated a separate counterfactual in which we took
the top 10% of each event's seats and assigned them a new price equal to the average observed
resale price for those seats, and then simulated market outcomes using the parameter estimates
from Table 3. Hence, under this counterfactual we add one additional price level to every event.43
We nd that primary market revenue increases by 13% (an average of approximately $150,000
per event). This is a lower bound for how much money producers are leaving on the table by
not scaling the house more nely. Setting higher prices for premium tickets also weakens buyers'
incentives to invest in early arrival: relative to the baseline model, arrival costs decline by 14%.
These results reinforce an obvious but important point|the ineciencies that give rise to resale
markets could be mostly eliminated through improvements in primary market pricing.
Forward-looking versus myopic consumers
Finally, we also examined what happens if we ignore the interplay between primary and
secondary markets|i.e., if we assume buyers are not forward-looking when they make their
primary market decisions. We eliminate brokers, assign the buyer sequence randomly (i.e., no
arrival game), and determine the primary market allocation by having consumers' rst-period
decisions depend only on their consumption utilities from attending the event. We then clear
the resale market as in the baseline model. Ignoring the potential prots from resale obviously
reduces the perceived value of the tickets; our model predicts that primary market sales would
decline by 1.2% if rst-period decisions were made myopically.44 The magnitude of the decline
gives a rough indication of how many primary market purchases are speculative in the baseline
model|i.e., how many tickets are purchased only because the buyer expects to resell for a prot.
43In the other counterfactuals we consider changes to the fundamental parameters. In this case we kept the
same parameters but considered a change to the data.
44Recall that the level of resale activity in the base case is somewhat low. If transaction costs were low,
this exercise would undoubtedly reveal a much larger dierence between forward-looking consumers and myopic
consumers.
368 Conclusion
A common complaint from consumers is that resale markets make it more dicult to obtain
tickets in the primary market. However, before the internet boosted ticket reselling (by low-
ering resale transaction costs), consumers complained about the diculty of getting tickets to
popular events at all. Our modeling approach captures both of these eects. Resale stimulates
competition for tickets in the primary market, making it costlier (in an eort sense) to buy in
the primary market. But resale also makes it easier for consumers to buy tickets to any event
in the resale market, as long as they are willing to pay market-driven prices. In other words,
resale exacerbates the problems associated with excess demand in the primary market (i.e. costly
rent-seeking behavior), but makes the nal allocation of goods to consumers more ecient. This
paper has sought to clarify these eects and empirically quantify their magnitudes.
Our approach has focused on the interdependence of primary and secondary markets, and is
the rst (to our knowledge) to analyze data from both markets in parallel. Our ndings show
that while the basic economics of resale markets are simple (buy low, sell high), the welfare
consequences of resale|in particular, the distribution of gains and losses|are more subtle. In
the market for rock concerts, we nd that observed levels of resale activity do not generate
dramatic welfare gains relative to a world without resale. However, substantial increases in
social surplus could be realized by eliminating or reducing frictions in the resale market (e.g.,
transaction costs). To the extent that online marketplaces like eBay, StubHub, craigslist, and
others facilitate secondary market exchanges by lowering transaction costs, we can infer that
their services increase the total surplus generated by the market for event tickets.
Resale leads to a more ecient allocation of tickets, but does so at a cost. By enabling
protable resale transactions, it motivates individuals to engage in costly rent-seeking behavior in
the primary market. Our analysis emphasizes how strategic interactions amplify these costs. We
nd that these costs are substantial. Comparing the observed level of resale to a counterfactual
world with no resale, half of the gain in gross surplus from reallocation is oset by increased
arrival and transaction costs.
Not everyone benets from resale. In particular, consumers who attend the event may be
worse o when resale markets become more uid. Seats are allocated more eciently|high
quality seats end up being occupied by consumers with the highest willingness to pay|but the
additional surplus generated by the improved allocation is mostly captured by resellers. As a
group, concert attendees would have preferred less eciently allocated tickets obtained at lower
prices. We nd that frictionless resale markets would lower the surplus of concert attendees by
17% on average. Thus, if the aim of public policy is to maximize total surplus (as arguably it
37should be), then our ndings provide some support for the repeal of anti-scalping laws. From
a consumer protection standpoint, however, the conclusion may be dierent: if the narrow goal
is to maximize the surplus of those who ultimately attend the event, then restrictions on resale
may be warranted.
Our results also imply that resale markets on average lead to higher revenues for primary
market sellers. More generally, our analysis highlights the degree to which resale activity is driven
by pricing practices in the primary market. As primary market sellers implement increasingly
sophisticated pricing schemes, resale activity should be expected to decline. Ticketmaster, for
example, has actively encouraged artists to sell concert tickets using an auction mechanism.
Indeed, one interpretation of why scalping arises is that brokers are more ecient at implement-
ing such schemes (see Swoord, 1999), and as primary market sellers develop these capabilities
themselves the value of brokers will diminish.
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43Table 3: Estimated parameters
Parameter Notation Estimate Std. Error
Consumers' transaction cost c 61.208 1.417
Brokers' transaction cost b 5.389 2.032
Curvature  1.011 0.166
Mean of willingness to pay ! -0.345 0.299
SD of willingness to pay ! 1.085 0.184
Mean of arrival cost  1.739 0.180
SD of arrival cost  1.554 0.121
Correlation of WTP, arrival cost !=! -0.522 0.036
Scale for brokers' arrival costs b 0.169 0.206
Prob(conict)   0.014 0.003
Prob(broker)  0.004 0.003
Scale factor for event eects   1.043 0.069
Parameter of arrival cost function c0 1.061 0.108
Number of bidders in resale auctions L 2.364 0.488
SD of event-specic demand shock  0.445 0.132
44Table 4: Counterfactual simulations: no resale vs. frictionless resale
Endogenous Arrival Random Arrival
No resale Base case Frictionless No resale Frictionless
Gross surplus of attendees 100.0 101.0 111.7 68.5 108.5
Transactions costs incurred 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Arrival costs incurred 6.9 7.0 8.7 0.0 0.0
Net surplus 93.1 93.6 103.0 68.5 108.5
Primary market revenues 43.1 44.0 45.4 44.1 46.2
Resellers' prots:
Brokers 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3
Non-brokers -3.6 -3.6 13.0 0.0 10.8
Attendees' net surplus 53.6 53.1 44.4 24.4 25.9
Numbers represent averages across events, with 100 model simulations for each event. Numbers are normalized
so that attendees' gross surplus equals 100 in the \no resale" case with endogenous arrival. For the \base case"
column, the model is simulated at the estimated parameters. The \no resale" column reects outcomes when
transactions costs are set arbitrarily high; the \frictionless" case reects outcomes when transactions costs are
set to zero and the number of bidders in the secondary market auctions is set to 600. The \endogenous arrival"
columns correspond to the model we estimate, in which buyers make strategic arrival decisions in the primary
market. In the \random allocation" columns, we simply assign the buyer sequence randomly (and independently
of buyers' willingness to pay).
45Table 5: Counterfactual simulations: the impact of brokers
No brokers Base case More brokers More brokers
( = 0) ( = 0:004) ( = 0:02) ( = 0:10)
Gross surplus of attendees 99.3 100.0 104.8 107.2
Transactions costs incurred 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.0
Arrival costs incurred 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.2
Net surplus 91.9 92.6 97.3 100.1
Primary market revenues 42.7 43.4 47.0 51.7
Resellers' prots:
Brokers 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.8
Non-brokers -3.6 -3.6 -3.3 -2.3
Attendees' net surplus 52.8 52.7 53.1 49.7
Numbers represent averages across events, with 100 model simulations for each event. Numbers are normalized
so that attendees' gross surplus equals 100 in the \no brokers" case.
46Figure 1: Two sample events




































Seat quality (worst to best)
Cubic polynomial Local polynomial regression




























Seat quality (worst to best)
Cubic polynomial Local polynomial regression
49Figure 4: Probability of resale by price level






























In generating this gure, only events with two or more price levels were used. Relative seat qualities are calculated
within price level for this gure, and the probability of resale is estimated using kernel-weighted local polynomial
regression. So, for example, the probability of resale is on average higher for the best seats in price level 2 than
for the worst seats in price level 1.
















































Onsale date Event date
Time (normalized)
Secondary market sales
Time is normalized to make it comparable across events; it is measured as (days since onsale)/(total days between
onsale and event). The histogram in the top panel represents the 1,034,353 tickets sold by Ticketmaster; the
bottom panel represents the 51,318 tickets resold on eBay or StubHub.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of omega
Arrival cost Arrival position
Percentage changes in average arrival cost incurred (solid line) and average arrival position (dashed line), by
decile of willingness-to-pay (!), when we move from a world without resale to a world with frictionless resale. For
example, the average arrival costs of buyers with !'s in the lowest decile increase by over 500% under frictionless
resale, but their average arrival position is essentially unaected.
53